Abstract-Recent trend towards cloud computing and outsourcing has led to the requirement for face recognition (FR) to be performed remotely by third-party servers. When outsourcing the FR, client's test image and classification result will be revealed to the servers. Within this context, we propose a novel privacypreserving (PP) FR algorithm based on randomization. Existing PP FR algorithms are based on homomorphic encryption (HE) which requires higher computational power and communication bandwidth. Since we use randomization, the proposed algorithm outperforms the HE based algorithm in terms of computational and communication complexity. We validated our algorithm using popular ORL database. Experimental results demonstrate that accuracy of the proposed algorithm is the same as the accuracy of existing algorithms, while improving the computational efficiency by 120 times and communication complexity by 2.5 times against the existing HE based approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Face recognition (FR) is a computer application for automatically identifying a person from a digital image. One way to do this is by comparing selected facial features from the image and a facial database. Building a FR classifier requires a large number of valid training samples. One viable solution to this problem is to outsource the FR to a more computationally powerful third-party. Outsourcing the FR mitigates the requirement of not only a large number of valid training data samples but also high computational, storage resources, and maintenance requirements for clients (i.e., individuals or small organizations).
In general, FR problem can be solved using mathematical model which is based on two phases: training phase and testing phase.Traditionally, training and testing were performed within the same environment. However, when outsourcing the FR to the third-party, the client and server become mutually untrusted parties and releasing the data samples owned by the client to the server raises privacy concerns [1] , [2] . Furthermore, the server may not wish to disclose any details or parameters of its training data set even if it offers classification service to the client. In order to mitigate these privacy vulnerabilities, in literature, privacy-preserving (PP) FR algorithm is proposed based on homomorphic encryption (HE) [7] . HE schemes such as Paillier are public key cryptosystems and uses large keys for encryption and decryption [15] . This involves exponentiation of very large number, which is computationally intensive operation. On the other hand, the HE used for data classification schemes can perform limited number of operations in encrypted domain (either addition or multiplication). Hence, more number of interactions between client and server is required to obtain the classification result. Hence, in this paper, we propose a lightweight PP FR protocol based on randomization technique.
II. FACE RECOGNITION: A CONVENTIONAL APPROACH
An efficient approach to recognize human faces is to transform face images into characteristic feature vectors of a lower dimensional vector space [3] . Principal component analysis (PCA) is a well-known feature extraction method which aims to obtain a set of mutually orthogonal bases that describe the global information of the data points in terms of variance [3] .
A. PCA Based Feature Extraction
Suppose we have C number of facial image classes. Let n c be the number of facial images for cth class. The total number of facial images can thus be denoted as N = C c=1 n c . Let us assume that each facial image is a real valued grayscale image and can be represented as a matrix, where each element corresponds to the pixel value of a point within the image. A two-dimensional facial image matrix can be converted to a one-dimensional vector by stacking each column (or row) of the matrix into a long vector. Denote x i ∈ Z n×1 as a vector representation of the ith facial image.
Let us start with a training set of facial images
. . , N . Using these training data samples, we can train a classifier to classify an unlabeled test sample. Initially, the training data needs to be normalized to keep the numeric values of training samples on the same scale. Let us denote the normalized training data samples as x i ∈ R n×1 , i = 1, . . . , N where,
, denotes the mean of the training data samples. Let us define a matrix X as follows:
. Now the covariance matrix, C, of the normalized training data samples can be defined as follows:
The Eigenfaces are the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix or scatter matrix, C, defined in (2). The transformation matrix U can be obtained using the following optimization
where {u i ∈ R n×1 | i = 1, . . . m} is a set of eigenvectors corresponding to the m largest eigenvalues of C.
Let us denote the projected image in the lower dimensional feature space corresponding to the image
, where m n. Hence, y i can be obtained by the following linear projection: 
B. Classification
After feature extraction, the classification can be based on 1-nearest-neighbor classifier (1-NN) [4] . In order to explain the classification phase, let us denote a test image before normalization ast = [ t 1 , . . . , t n ] T ∈ Z n×1 and after normalization as t = [t 1 , . . . , t n ]
T ∈ R n×1 where
Denote the low dimensional vector corresponding to t as w = [w 1 , . . . , w m ] T ∈ R m×1 where m n. Now t is projected by the projection matrix as
where
The squared Euclidean distance, d i , between w and y i , i = 1, . . . , N is
The decision rule of the 1-NN classifier is that the training image x * is said to have same features of the test image if
where d * is smaller than a given threshold T .
III. FACE RECOGNITION: IN PRIVATE
In this section, we show how the traditional algorithm can be extended to work in private. The new algorithm satisfies the following three requirements: R 1 − without public-key HE schemes, R 2 − hide the client's data and the result from the server, and R 3 − hide the server side parameters from the client.
A. Normalizing the test image in private
Initially, client's test image needs to be normalized before the classification. However, the client cannot send the test image,t, due to the privacy concerns. Hence, the client only sends a noise vector,η ∈ Z n×1 , with the same dimension as the test image. As shown in (6), server normalizes the noise vector,η, and obtains the normalized noise vector, η, as follows:
However, only the client knows the difference between the test image and the noise image. Let us denote the difference as γ =η −t ∈ Z n×1 . Hence, only the client can recover the normalized test image, t ∈ Z n×1 (i.e., t =t −x), from the normalized noise vector as follows:
B. Projecting the normalized noise onto the lower dimension space in private
Since the server has obtained only the normalized noise vector, he can only project the normalized noise vector onto the lower dimension space instead of normalized test image. Hence, as shown in (7), the server projects the normalized noise vector and obtains lower dimension vector, w = [w 1 ,w 2 , . . . ,w m ] ∈ R m×1 , as follows:
However, using (11), γ =η −t, t =t −x, (8) and (14), we can derivew k in terms of w k , k = 1, . . . , m as follows:
The scalar u T k γ in (15) is unknown to the server. Hence, the server uses only thew k , k = 1, . . . , m obtained in (14) for the distance calculation step instead of w k , k = 1, . . . , m.
C. Euclidean distance calculation in private
Since the server has only computedw, lets us denote the Euclidean distance betweenw and the low dimensional training image y i asd i , i = 1, . . . , N . Similar to (9), we can compute the Euclidean distancesd i , i = 1, . . . , N as
Since, η = t+γ, we can writed i in terms of
In the next subsection, we elaborate how the distances obtained in (17) can be used to obtain the matching training image.
D. Minimum distance calculation to match the test image to a known class in private
Let us call the difference between d i andd i in (17) as masking factor and denote it as
Let us rewrite (17) as follows:
In order to find the minimum distance, the server needs to remove the masking factor, m i , fromd i . Since the server does not know the difference vector, γ, or the normalized test image t, it is infeasible for the server to obtain a true distance values d i fromd i , i = 1, . . . , N . Hence, the server cannot find the matching training image corresponding to the test image using (17) . In order to obtain the matching image, the server needs to interact with the client by sending all thed i , i = 1, . . . , N . Before sendingd i , i = 1, . . . , N , the server generates random value r i for eachd i and send d i to the client where
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Now the client must interact with the server to compute m i + r i , i = 1, . . . , N . Using m i + r i , i = 1, . . . , N , the client can compute the actual Euclidean distances d i , i = 1, . . . , N as follows:
Since t =t −x,
It should be noted that masking values (i.e., m i + r i , i = 1, . . . , N ) should only be known to the client. If the masking values are known to the server, then the server can compute the actual Euclidean distances between the test and training images, and eventually the server can obtain the matching image corresponding to the test image which violates the client's privacy. In (20), the vectorst, and γ are only known to the client and the vectors u k , x i ,x and the random scalar r i are known only to the server. The vectors and scalars known to the server and client are mixed with each other in (20) and it is difficult to develop PP algorithm to securely compute the masking values m i + r i , ∀i at present. Hence, we need to reorder (20) such that, the variables known to the server to be on one side while the variables known to the client to other side. In order to compute (m i + r i ) in private let us propose a PP secure two-party algorithm in the next subsection.
1) Privacy
T sb ) ≈ r + a T b). Approximation errors due to the nearest integer approximation operation, . is discussed in the Section V. Table I shows the secure two-party computation algorithm to compute r + 1 s ( sa T b) privately. The security of the algorithm relies on masking the variables using large random noise. Let us explain the algorithm in Table I . The server knows r and b while client knows a. Let us assume that the client's input a is composed of integers while server's input b is composed of floating points. Since the elements of a are integer, the server converts the elements in b by scaling and nearest integer approximation operations. This will prevent any information leakage via floating points about the server side classification parameters to the client. Initially, the client add different random noises to each of the elements in a as shown in Steps 7 to 10 in Table I . Since noise is added to the elements of a, the server cannot filter the noise to recover the client side parameters, which satisfies the clients privacy requirement. Now the server execute the Steps from 14 to 21 and return the outcome to the client. In Step 21, the server adds random value s.r to l i=1 D i which protects the server side parameters from clients selective input attack as follows:
Algorithm in Table I outputs r i + a T b to the client. Let's assume that the server does not randomize the Euclidean distancesd i by random value r i , i = 1, . . . , N . In this case, a malicious user can infer the server's input vector b by selectively inputting binary vector e.g., if client wants to know b 1 then client can inputs vector [1 0 . . . 0]
T . However, since the server add freshly generated random value r i every time, it is impossible for the client to infer server's vector b.
2) Solve (20) Using the Algorithm in Table I : In this section, we show how we can compute (m i +r i ) in (20) using the algorithm in Table I . In order to exploit the algorithm in Table I, 
Let us define the following random variables r 4 , ∀k and assume that these random variables are generated by the server to randomize the scalar product output. If we incorporate these random variables within (21) then (21) becomes equal to (22) which is shown in the top of the next page.
In (22), the server knows u k , r 
can be transformed into (23) which is shown in the top of the page after next page.
In (23), the server knows 2 (u Table I , the client can obtain (m i + r i ) ∀i. This will enable the client to compute the true Euclidean distances between the test image and the training images using (19) . Hence, the client can find the smallest Euclidean distance using (10).
3) Privacy-preserving Identity Finding: Let us define a binary vector d b ∈ {0, 1} N,1 . If nth Euclidean distance is the smallest distance then, the client generates a binary vector d b by setting nth element to 1 while setting all other elements to 0. Let us denote the identity of nth training image as id n and define another vector called identity vec-
T . Client must keep the binary vector d b away from the server in order to protect the privacy of the test image. However, the client could exploit the algorithm in Table I to obtain the identity of the test image without revealing the d b as follows: The identity of the training image which is corresponding to the smallest Euclidean distance (i.e., lets assume nth training image) could be obtained by computing d T = id n ). It should be noted that the algorithm in Table I but with different inputs can be used to obtain the correct identity of the matching training image. If the client feeds the binary vector d b instead of a and if the server feeds the identity vector d id instead of s.b and 0 for r to the algorithm in Table I , then the output of the algorithm should be equivalent to the identity of the matching training image. 
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Initially, the client was just sending the noise vector η ∈ Z n×1 to the server instead of the true test imagẽ t ∈ Z n×1 . From this input, the server can only infer the size of the test image.
There is no interaction between the server and the client until the minimum distance calculation (Subsection III-D), hence, there is no information leakage in Subsection III-B and Subsection III-C to the client. However, the server may use different u k vectors to infer w k fromw k or d i from d i . However, since both w k and u T + γγ T − 2γx T i u k are depend on u k , the server cannot infer any client side parameter.
In Subsection III-D, the client and server interact with each other using an algorithm in Table I in order to compute the true Euclidean distances. The output of the algorithm in Table I is known only to the client, hence it is crucial to evaluate whether any malicious client can infer the server side parameters using the output. However, we proved that, since the server adds a random value r i at Step 21 in Table 1 , the client cannot learn the server side parameters, which satisfies the privacy requirements of the server.
Let us now analyse the security properties of the algorithm in Table I . If we carefully look at the Steps 8 and 10 in the algorithm in Table I , the elements of b are randomized by very large positive random integers c i + z i .β, where c i , z i , and β are only known to the client. Hence, it is infeasible for the server to extract elements of b from random noise, hence, the algorithm in Table I is secure enough to protect the client side parameters.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed algorithm using the ORL Database of Faces [6] . The ORL database contains 10 facial images of 40 distinct subjects i.e., number of classes equal to 40, totalling 400 images (see Fig. 1 ). The size of each image is 92 × 112 pixels with 256 grey levels per pixel i.e., n = 92 × 112 = 10304.
The aim of this experimental section is to show that the proposed method achieves the same recognition accuracy as that of the Paillier cryptography based PP FR approach of [7] . Approach in [7] does not degrade the performance of the plain domain algorithm. Hence it is obvious that our does not degrade the accuracy of the plain domain approach. In order to evaluate the performance, we use 5-fold cross validation for the experiments such that for each subject we use 8 images in the training phase and 2 images for testing phase, hence N = 8 × 40 = 320. [7] .
for Erkin [7] Proposed To illustrate the effect of the scalar s in Table I , we have plotted the classification accuracy of the proposed algorithm for five different scalar values in Fig. 2 . We also plotted the accuracy of [7] against the scaling factor in Fig. 2 . Our algorithm performs better than [7] for the smaller scaling factors. Also our algorithm achieves the maximum accuracy faster than [7] . The crucial point is that the classification accuracies of the both the algorithms eventually becomes equal (i.e., 96.25 percent) when s is at a sufficient level, in this case s > 10 4 . Hence, our algorithm does not degrade the performance of the traditional classification.
A. Computational complexity
In order to demonstrate the computational efficiency of the proposed method, we compare our algorithm against the algorithm in [7] . Let us set, without loss of generality, the security parameter to 1024 bits and denote the computational time (in ms) for multiplication, modulo exponentiation in 1024 bits field as C m and C e , respectively. Table II compares both the schemes in terms of the number of modulo exponentiations and multiplications. Note that our scheme does not require any computationally-expensive modulo exponentiations. From [8] , we can roughly estimate C e ≈ 240C m . Let us define computational efficiencies of the proposed algorithm against [7] at the client side and the server side as e C and e S , respectively where
Complexity f or client in [7] Complexity f or client in our algorithm , e S = Complexity f or server in [7] Complexity f or server in our algorithm . Table III shows the computational efficiency of the proposed algorithm for different set of parameters. In Table III , we calculate the efficiency at both the client and server side by varying the parameters m, N , and n. The computational complexity to the client in the proposed algorithm is almost 120 times less than the complexity required for [7] . At the server side, our algorithm outperforms when the total number of training images (N ) is less than 300. When N increases, the efficiency of the proposed algorithm at the server side drops slightly compared to [7] , however efficiency at the client side is constant irrespective of any parameters. If we consider the same parameters used in numerical analysis (i.e., N = 320, n = 10304, and m = 12) then both schemes share the same order of computational complexity at the server side. However, the computational efficiency at the client side in the proposed algorithm is 120 times higher than [7] .
B. Communication complexity
We measure the total communication complexity in terms of data being communicated between the server and client. In our algorithm, the client and server interact via only 8-bit data during the normalization and projection steps. Afterwards, they interact via the PP secure two-party algorithm proposed in Table I . The client initially sends 2×1024-bits to the server. Then the server sends back 5×1024×12×320 (i.e., N = 320, and m = 12) size of data to the client. Finally, in order to find the identity of the matched image, the client sends 1024×320-bits to the server which sends back another 1024-bits to the client. In total, the communication bandwidth required for our algorithm is 2.499M B. However, the communications complexity of the Paillier cryptography based FR algorithm [7] requires (n + m + 1) × 1024 = (10304 + 12 + 1) × 1024 = 1.32M B bandwidth for the normalization and projection steps. For the match finding steps, [7] requires 6N + N (2l + 1) × 1024 = 6 × 320 + 320 × (106 + 1) × 1024 = 4.63M B. In total, [7] requires 6MB of bandwidth, when security parameter is 1024, which is nearly 2.5 times higher than the proposed approach.
VI. RELATED WORKS There were several classification algorithms developed in pattern recognition and machine learning for different applications [9] . However, only a few of them have been redesigned for PP classification in literature ( [7] , [10] - [14] , [19] and references therein). Majority of the work in the literature were developed for the distributed setting where different parties hold parts of the training data sets and securely train a common classifier without each party needing to disclose its own training data to other parties [13] , [14] . The works in [13] , [14] exploited the secure multi-party integer summation in order to compute the kernel matrix. Basically, each party generates a Gramm matrix using scalar products of training and test data samples. This Gramm matrix is later revealed to the trusted third party who will compute the kernel matrix and then classify the test sample. Revealing the Gramm matrix may leak the private data and, therefore, privacy cannot be entirely preserved.
Recently, Yuan et.al. proposed an efficient biometric identification based on random matrix operations and without HE and garbled circuit [16] . In fact, the work in [16] is about biometric identification (our work is about biometric recognition). In our method, the classification result and test image are known only to the client while [16] reveals the result and the test sample to another party who is using the cloud computing.
PP data classification algorithms suitable for a client-server model were studied in [7] , [10] - [12] . We stress here that these works are developed based on HE. Efficient PP FR algorithm based on garbled circuit and oblivious transfer function was proposed in [18] . In [18] , Sadeghi et al. proposed two algorithms: one is purely based on garbled circuit and other one is combination of Paillier HE and garbled circuit. The work in [18] improved the complexity of [7] by nearly four times (our algorithm is 120-times faster than [7] ) by exploiting efficient minimum value and minimum index garbled circuit.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a lightweight FR to outsource the FR task to untrusted third-parties. We exploited randomization technique to preserve the privacy of the client and server side parameters. Since the proposed method excluded the usage of HE, the computational and communication complexities were substantially reduced compare to the existing schemes. In order to validate the proposed methods, we have experimented our method on popular face image database. The experiment results show that the classification accuracy of the proposed method is same as the traditional approach, which proves reliability of the proposed method.
